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It is possible to look at the sociology of law from 
many points of view. It may be regarded as: (a) one 
of the branches of general sociology (a problem im­
mediately arises as to what specific features distin­
guish the sociology of law from other sociological 
approaches, and also what the sociology of law may 
contribute to general sociological knowledge that is 
new and specific); (b) a modern version to replace 
the obsolete, semantically vague and methodological­
ly suspicious jurisprudence (which raises the question 
of whether the sociology of law can replace jurispru­
dence without abandoning an important field of in­
quiry—the analysis of basic philosophical notions 
which are inherent in the legalistic way of thinking 
and problem-solving); or (c) a cryptic and misleading 
term supposed to cover a seemingly new (in contrast 
to the old, traditional) approach to essential legal 
problems but only introducing sociological techniques 
of investigation secondary to the basic legal ones 
(in which case a legitimate objection could be raised 
that the sociology of law is only a convenient and rath­
er empty slogan which reveals several additional, 
and helpful, but nevertheless second-rate means of 
enlarging the traditional accepted legal outlook on 
the law).
Which point of view is methodologically the most 
proper? Which is the most adequate for dealing with 
current empirical discoveries? Which one reflects 
most closely the insights generated during the still 
lively discussions pertaining to the basic problems 
of the legal sciences?
In order to answer these questions we must look 
at some existing definitions of the sociology of law. 
P. Selznick says, «The sociology of law may be re­
garded as an attempt to marshal what we know about 
the natural elements of social life and to bring that 
knowledge to bear on a consciously sustained enter­
prise, governed by special objectives and ideas.»1 
He distinguishes three stages of the development of 
the sociology of law: (1) the primitive or missionary 
stage, (2) the stage which belongs to the sociological 
craftsman, and (3) the stage of true maturity where 
«the sociologist goes beyond (without repudiating) 
the role of technician or engineer and addresses him­
self to the larger objectives and guiding principles 
of the particular human enterprise he has elected 
to study.»2 J. Skolnick has a slightly different approach 
to the question: «The most important work for the 
sociologist of law is the development of theory grow­
ing out of empirical, especially institutional studies,»
1. P. Selznick. «The Sociology of Law» in: Law and the Be­
havioral Sciences, eds. Friedman, L., Macaulay, S., Bobbs- 
Merrill, 1969, pp. 203.
2. Op. cit., p. 3.
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and also: «The most general contribution that the 
sociology of law may make to social theory is that 
of understanding the relation between law and social 
organization.»1 V. Aubert tells us that the sociology 
of law is part of a general discipline, namely the sociol­
ogy of science which deals with the specific legal way 
of thinking.2 A. Podgórecki proposes as a definition: 
«The sociology of law has as its task not only to reg­
ister, formulate and verify the general interrelations 
existing between the law and other social factors 
(law could then be regarded as an independent or 
dependent variable), but also to try and build a gen­
eral theory to explain social processes in which the 
law is involved and in this way link this discipline 
with the bulk of sociological knowledge.»3
These definitions, like all definitions in the social 
sciences, try to focus attention on specific problems 
and to emphasize certain aspects of complicated so­
cial reality. Therefore, these and other definitions 
may be regarded as an academic attempt to contain 
within a general description the different tasks per­
formed by scholarly specialists who consider and 
deliberate over various relationships existing between 
the law and social structure.
Nevertheless, despite these attempts to «grasp the 
essence» of the sociology of law, a new, in some ways 
completely different—but still rooted in previous, 
traditional attitudes—approach to the sociology of 
law emerges as a possible new pattern of inquiry. 
This attempt is visible in various other inquiries 
but is especially clear in a comprehensive Italian 
study (1965-1971) on the administration of justice.4 
In this particular case several features of the new type 
of approach become visible: (a) a social issue of great 
importance was selected as the object of compre­
hensive, interdisciplinary analysis, (b) a social diag­
nosis covering a vast range of problems, issues and
1. J. Skolnick, «The Sociology of Law in America: Overview 
and Trends,» Law and Society. Supplement to Summer, 1965, 
Issue of Social Problems, 4 (1965).
2. Aubert, V. Sociology of Law (mimeographed material), 
Oslo.
3. A. Podgórecki, Sociologia Prawa, Warszawa, 1962, p. 15.
4. R. Treves, The Administration of Justice in Italy (A So­
ciological Survey), Varese, 1971 (mimeographed). J. Ben-David 
in his article : «How to Organize Research in the Social Sci­
ences» in: Daedalus, Spring 1973, Voi. 102, No. 2, makes exactly 
the same point: «According to my analysis, one of the principal 
problems in social science in this lack of recognition that many 
of the questions investigated by social scientists require an 
eclectic approach like that of clinical medicine or engineering. 
In this respect there seems actually to have been some retro­
gression since the investigation of social problems carried out 
in the United States during the 1930’s. Projects such as Recent 
Social Trends published in 1934 as a result of the collaboration 
of outstanding economists, political scientists, and sociologists, 
or the work on racial discrimination in the USA., directed by 
Gunnar Myrdal, an economist working with sociologists, did 
not have a sequel after World War II.»
open questions was offered in an attempt to describe, 
in general language, a variety of different processes 
proceeding at different rates in different directions, 
but complying on the whole with a general pattern, 
(c) partial and more general explanations were pro­
posed to find reasons for the interactions registered 
and described, (d) some proposals having the char­
acter of social engineering were formulated as part 
of this comprehensive study.
Perhaps this new attempt is simply complementary 
to the old one in that it tries to stress the need for 
solving problems of great social importance which 
were overlooked by classical scientists. If so, many 
methodological possibilities through a new combina­
tion of traditional disciplines remain open. Let us, 
instead of looking for a perfect definition of sociolo­
gy of law prepared in a somewhat analytical manner, 
take into account the achievements and difficulties 
which the sociology of law (a relatively new science 
in its empirical version) has accumulated up to now. 
Some of these problems are of a mainly methodo­
logical character. Thus, to what extent has the les­
son to be drawn from the sociology of law by the 
legal sciences enriched these sciences? Perhaps an 
elliptical answer would be proper at the beginning. 
The lesson imparted by the sociology of law revealed 
that traditional legal reasoning is limited when used 
as the main tool and instrument in solving legal prob­
lems. A further question immediately arises: On what 
grounds is so-called legal reasoning based? Again, 
the answer—if given at all—is: Legal reasoning is 
based on the grounds of common sense and specif­
ically legalistic professional abilities. And yet com­
mon sense, with all due respect, is limited and yields 
to systematic knowledge. Moreover, the professional 
abilities of lawyers, unique to those possessing them, 
are biased by the experience accumulated by a given 
profession. These shortcomings create the major 
limitations of the traditional use of legal reasoning. 
But if this is the situation, what new and more spe­
cific sociological methods could be offered such as 
to enlarge, deepen and sharpen our insight into the 
complicated operation of legal and social processes?
In order to give a more satisfactory answer to these 
questions, an overview of the various methods which 
are useful in supplementing the traditional know­
ledge of law is needed.
methods of socio-legal research
There are several methods which could be of some 
use in discussing the problem of the social content 
of the law or of its legitimacy and binding force. 
These are: the historical-descriptive, ethnographic- 
comparative, questionnaire and interview, analysis 
of legal materials, monographic method, experimen-
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tal method, and finally, the comparative method. 
Let us examine briefly—as a contrast to prevailing 
in jurisprudence method of analytical thinking— 
their possible applications.
the historical-descriptive method
The historical method in the sociology of law as­
sumes the diachronic approach in research, reaching 
back into the past. It makes use of various docu­
ments, such as private and official records, mem­
oirs, publications, etc., recorded in any type of 
writing, cuneiform, hieroglyphics, or in symbols such 
as seals or coats of arms. The historical method 
requires expert critical source analysis, immediate 
and direct. In some cases this method may lack suf­
ficient precision; in others it may bring many in­
teresting results.
Traditionally used, the historical method when 
applied to law was supposed to describe this or that 
legal enactment, status or institution in its unique 
historical perspective. The more historical facts, 
the more details describing the idiosyncratic fla­
vor and atmosphere of a given legal event, the more 
productive the application of this method. The mod­
ern version, which could fruitfully be used in the un­
derstanding of the law takes a different methodologi­
cal orientation. It tries to compare types of social 
systems and the legal systems corresponding to them. 
Without going into detail, it is possible to say that 
there are at least three basic relationships between 
social systems and the legal systems attached to 
them: (1) obsolete legal systems (when social needs 
outpace the rigidified tradition-bound requirements 
of the legal system), (2) adequate legal systems (when 
social needs are in some harmony with the set of 
legal constructs and norms which constitute the le­
gal system as a whole), (3) progressive legal systems 
(when the legal system is more developed, more 
enlightened than economic and political social 
conditions, which resist its creative pressure). Of 
course, the real situation is always more compli­
cated: legal systems are not stable; they are, in gen­
eral (as I. Raz says in this connection), temporary 
due to the fact that they are changing all the time; new 
laws are enacted continuously and some legal norms 
lose their binding force. (Perhaps it would be better 
to speak of «jumping,» «trembling,» legal systems— 
they «jump,» «tremble» all the time, subsequently 
changing their scope and content.)
This new point of view offers a far-reaching theo­
retical perspective. It could illuminate the up to now 
obscure general problem: Under what conditions 
can a legal system be adopted or taken over by other 
social systems? There are not only technical inno­
vations; legal ideas, legal norms and constructs can
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also be regarded as social innovations. Parts of Ger­
man law (especially the part connected with urban 
settlement) were adopted in Poland.1 These elements 
of foreign legal systems were adopted because they 
were needed; they were functional and in accord with 
the new social and economic trends. After World 
War II Japan (in addition to the previously adopted 
civil law taken mainly from France and Germany) 
borrowed and adopted American constitutional law.
All these «travels,» «transplantations,» voluntary 
and involuntary adaptations are better understood 
when the more elaborated scheme of soci ohi storical 
thinking is adopted. Then the directions of and rea­
sons for the flow of legal innovations can be grasped 
in a deeper perspective; not as the influence of a giv­
en institution or another institution or one legal 
philosopher on another one, but as a complementary 
interchange of legal innovations and ideas. Also, 
unexpected and undesired negative byproducts of 
these exchanges could be better understood. Some 
elements of a newly adopted legal system which 
were adjusted and «natural» in the paternal social 
system could be regarded as strange, alien and unac­
ceptable by some members of the receiving social 
system; they do not carry the stamp of traditionally 
accepted institutions. This point of view also explains 
why some new legal systems or their elements, al­
though rational and potentially fully functional, are 
violently rejected, against all rational arguments. 
They do not have the traditional «charisma» which 
stems from their own nationally, socially or histori­
cally accepted background. The presence or absence 
of this specific charisma is an additional, independent 
element that could be historically detected and which 
could modify the social behavior of members of a 
given social system in an essential way.
the ethnographic-comparative method
This method is somewhat similar to the historical 
one. It consists of studying the behavioral phenomena 
of various cultures in so-called primitive societies. 
Contemporary civilized social relations are extremely 
complex, whereas so-called primitive societies some­
times offer opportunities for observing legal interac­
tions reduced to sui generis, laboratory simplicity. 
Because studies performed by means of the ethno­
graphic-comparative method are usually carried out 
in cultures which differ from the researcher’s own, 
the data obtained by this method must be very care­
fully cross-controlled by as many means as possible. 
The technique of participant observation seems to be 
indispensable here, for after some time it allows the
1. W. Wasjutynski, «Origins of Polish Law, Tenth to Fifteenth 
Centuries» in '.Polish Law throughout the Ages (W. J. Wagner, 
ed.), Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1970, pp. 62-63.
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scholar to identify more or less with the cultural 
environment under study. Then, losing the social 
distance separating him from the problems (and often 
thus losing the ability to grasp them), he acquires— 
at the possible price of anthropological bindness— 
a better ability to understand them.
What does a scholar who has adopted the point 
of view of jurisprudence gain from an anthropologi­
cal perspective? At least two new cognitive dimen­
sions may be obtained. One is recognition of the lim­
ited validity of generally accepted legal definitions; 
the second is recognition of the relatively narrow 
validity of the law itself.
Traditional lawyers are inclined (even if they disa­
gree in the details) to define the law as official norms 
promulgated by legitimized authorities and provided 
with sanctions which safeguard conformity to these 
norms. There are many weak elements in a definition 
of this type. E. g.,What does «official norm» mean? 
Which authorities are «legitimized»? What sort of 
sanctions are recognized as legal (formal, informal)? 
Let us omit there the eternal discussions concerned 
with these questions and point out, instead, that 
anthropological studies show that informal (living, 
intuitive) law functions even where so-called legiti­
mized authorities do not exist. In the absence of these 
types of authorities, phenomena which could be de­
fined by an observer as legal norms are treated by 
the people for whom these phenomena have validity 
as «law.» They produce behavior which in all so-called 
civilized societies is termed «legal,» and they are 
surrounded by institutions (serving as mediators) 
which, according to general standards, would also 
be called legal institutions. The vast evidence furnished 
by anthropological studies thus shows—contrary to 
existing theoretical beliefs—that the law as such could 
exist and function without the feature that would seem 
absolutely necessary: compulsory sanctions enforced 
by legitimized authorities. Briefly, it is possible to 
say that anthropological studies support (through 
evidence gathered from different types of societies) 
the thesis earlier formulated by L. Petrazycki1 and E. 
Ehrlich2 in connection with industrialized societies. 
According to L. Petrazycki (intuitive law) and E. 
Ehrlich (living law), a more adequate (not crippled, 
too narrow and therefore biased) understanding of 
the law could be obtained through a definition which 
grasps the law’in its entire scope of actual functioning, 
not only in the scope officially described. This is 
the core of the first lesson which emerges when the 
traditional point of view is enlarged by the anthro­
pological approach.
1. L. Petrazycki. Law and Morality: Leon Petraiycki. Cam­
bridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1955.
2. E. Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of
Law (English translation), Harvard University Press, 1936.
A second dimension is also quite essential. Several 
empirical anthropological studies conducted by, 
for example, P. Bohannan,3 U. Goldschmidt,4 
M. Gluckman,6 as well as findings from a study 
conducted by Pyong-Choon Hahm,6 which is on the 
border line between anthropological research and 
public opinion investigation, show that the law has a 
limited influence on human behavior. When the 
interplay of all possible kinds of motives determining 
human social activities is analysed, it becomes ap­
parent that motives which have a strictly legal char­
acter play a quite limited role. In all those social 
situations where members of a given group are en­
gaged in many additional activities influenced by 
membership in other than the basic primary group, 
the relations existing inside the primary group are 
strongly affected by the feedback from the relations 
outside this group. The multiple relations in which 
members of the society engage change and limit 
this pattern of behavior, that is prevalent in imperson­
al, industrialized, rationalized societies. In these 
societies, individuals suddenly, mainly by chance or 
voluntary decisions which can always be changed, 
engage in legal relations, behave according to pat­
terns provided by them, and disengage themselves in 
a manner that is prescribed a priori. Then, they disap­
pear from the social scene. This type of behavior 
is not possible in societies characterized by multiple 
relations created by affiliation to multiply interrelated 
social groups. In such societies the pattern of a de­
cent (or a «reasonable») man emerges as a model 
which is more functional—from the point of view 
of an efficient instrument supposed to solve social 
conflicts and also to smoothe over social relations 
—than the limited, detached, rational, disengaged, 
impersonal model of a law-abiding citizen. And, as 
Macauley has shown, using the example of interre­
lations between businessmen in the most technological­
ly advanced industrialized society, the pattern of 
strictly law-abiding citizens does not prevail in these 
professional circles, but the pattern of the decent 
man, who seemed so typical in the so-called primitive 
societies, does.7
3. D. Bohannan, Justice and Judgment among the Tiv., 
London, 1957.
4. V. Goldschmidt, Social Tolerance and Frustration (mim­
eographed paper), Nordvijk, Holland, 1972 and earlier pa­
per: «The Greenland Criminal Code and Its Sociological Back­
ground» in: Acta Sociologica, yol. 1, Fase. 4, 1956.
5. M. Gluckman, «Concepts in the Comparative Study of 
Tribal Law» in Law in Culture and Society, ed. Laura Nader, 
Chicago, 1969.
6. Pyong-Choon Hahm, «The Decision Process in Korea» 
in Comparative Judicial Behavior, ed. by G. Schubert, D. 
Danelski, Oxford University Press, 1969.
7. S. Macaulay, «Non-Contractual Relations in Business: 
A Preliminary Study» in Law and Behavioral Sciences, ed. 
L. Friedman, S. Macauly, Bobbs-Merrill, 1969, pp. 145-168.
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The anthropological perspective offers an addition­
al intellectual tool which could be useful for the le­
gal sciences: It provides criteria which make possible 
the classification of societies from the point of view 
of their relationship to the law. Before a more e- 
laborate classification is proposed, a tentative one 
could be offered: (a) societies which avoid the law 
(members of these societies turn to the law only in 
ultimate situations when all accessible means of in­
formal social control have obviously failed); (b) 
pro-legal societies which stress the importance of 
the law as a needed instrument of social change on an 
individualistic and global scale (members of these 
societies would be encouraged to use the law and thus 
give the state the possibility of control over all inter­
relations among its subordinates; also, members of 
these societies would have an intrinsic need to use the 
law as an efficient instrument to measure, manipulate 
and shape social distance, social costs and gains); 
(c) societies which regard the law as a useful tool for 
establishing social relations, but one of secondary 
importance (members being skeptical about the im­
mediate and constant use of the law, would still be 
willing to use it as a subsidiary device when other 
instruments of social control, regarded as more 
reliable and corresponding more to the image of a 
«decent man,» have been found to be ineffective). If 
such a classification were to be accepted, an example 
of a society with anti-legal inclinations might be Ita­
ly. As an example of a pro-legal society, traditional 
Germany could be cited, or socialistic societies which 
stress the role of the law in shaping new forms of 
social order. So-called primitive societies, or some 
subcultures in modern complex industrialized socie­
ties, could be regarded—from the point of view of the 
proposed classification—as societies in which the 
secondary, subsidiary role of law prevails.
method for the analysis of legal material
Studies of judicial records and administrative files 
of statistical data related to them, of minutes, re­
ports, explanations of legislative motives (justifica­
tions), notions de lege ferenda, etc., are examples of 
applications of this method (or rather, technique). 
It can help in gaining an insight into the functioning 
of legal precepts (e.g., a deficient functioning of a le­
gal precept will cause an increase in the number of 
appeals in cases regulated by it). It can also permit us 
to find out whether or not some legal norms are vio­
lated (if they are, the number of the relevant cases, 
appeals, suits, etc., will be increased). Through this 
method we can also collect data for the verification 
of hypotheses underlying the legal precepts or nor­
mative enactments. This method, of course, has both 
advantages and certain disadvantages.
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The obvious advantage of method of the analysis 
of legal material is that the same researcher, or an­
other one (in order to check on the first one, or to 
supplement his findings) can utilize the same material 
several times. The data remain intact and accessible 
and any necessary double-checks or additional stu­
dies for the verification of new ideas which might have 
emerged during the research procedure are possible. 
Another advantage is that usually the data which 
are stored in legal materials are indicators of actions 
which were possible or which in fact took place. In 
this way the legal data refer to behavior rather than 
to values and attitudes connected with legal prob­
lems. This important link makes the material espe­
cially valuable, for in socio-legal studies what really 
counts is the legal behavior itself. Lawyers (oriented 
toward duty as they are) see legal behavior through 
the normative glasses of status, precedent or adminis­
trative decision; when asked about legal behavior 
they would go to the law as it appears in the books 
and would extrapolate this law into action. Agreements 
which are supposed to be contracts, different types 
of informal wills, notes, letters, statistics, complaints, 
economic records, administrative memoranda—all 
these are data which usually escape the normatively 
trained lawyer as a possible source of coded legal 
knowledge.
As J. Górecki has clearly shown in his studies on 
divorce, this sort of material can be of utmost val­
ue.1 In his inquiry he went so far his records even 
such gestures as relaxed or clenched fists. Addition­
ally, he was able to show in a clear way that the le­
gal material collected in contested cases—since 
quarreling parties engaged in a conflict have a ten­
dency to disclose all possible documents to support 
their position—gives a more adequate picture of the 
existing marital situation because of the variety of the 
evidence. On the other hand, material delivered by 
uncontesting parties very often gives a fabricated sto­
ry prepared for the judge who, in such a situation, 
is neither willing nor able to check it. The recorded 
material remains in the archives and later on, after 
the flavor of each case has evaporated, the possibility 
of evaluating its credibility gradually disappears. 
Another serious shortcoming is that a substantial 
portion of legally relevant events does not come to 
the attention of legal institutions and is thus not re­
corded. Quite often, those actions which violate the 
law are covered in the records of legal institutions. 
Even then, only part of these represent law-breaking 
behavior. And still an important question is left open 
as to what part of this type of behavior remains out­
side of recorded data.
1. J. Górecki, «Divorce in Poland — ASocio-Legal Study,» 
Acta Sociologica, No. 10, 1966.
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Generally speaking, socio-legal studies require a 
cooperative and comprehensive use of different 
types of research methods and techniques. But the 
analysis of legal materials, more than any other type 
of research method, requires complementary syp- 
port.
the experimental method
In spite of prevailing beliefs, the experimental meth­
od can be applied to investigations of the function­
ing of the law. Even though deliberate experimenta­
tion in law-making, such as passing normative acts 
in order to obtain some cognitive results remains 
quite exceptional, still intentional experiments are 
quite frequent, especially when law is used as an in­
strument of administration.
As this author learned in the People’s Republic of 
China in 1963,1 a tentative family law was passed in 
that country with the intention of observing the re­
sults of the new legal enactment, checking them, im­
proving the law, and giving the final version of the 
law the power of a binding state force. In Poland, 
in 1960, a new institution for the administration of 
justice, the Workers’ Courts, was set up (it started in a 
single voivodship [province] and later gradually began 
operating throughout the country).2 These courts, 
the members of which are elected from among the 
workers by their colleagues, have no prescribed for­
mal procedure, but make use solely of the pressure 
of quasi-public opinion within the given group. The 
idea behind this limited, quasi-natural experiment was 
to collect and gain professional experience about 
this new institution (which, according to the Soviet 
pattern, was supposed to enlarge the instruments 
of formal and, at the same time, informal control 
over the behavior of social groups particularly ex­
posed to lawbreaking). In 1965, a new law was passed 
in Poland which gave the support of official law to 
the workers’ courts. Interestingly enough, the profes­
sional experience of judges, lawyers, prosecutors, ad­
ministrators, legislators at a lower level was care­
fully taken into account. Nevertheless, the sociologi­
cal study which was to be carried on in a parallel 
manner was omitted, apparently because the habit 
of consultation with social science experts is still 
not established as a completely legitimate procedure.
However, despite the limited possibilities, the ex­
perimental method coul be used to study the law in 
force because of the binding value of equality before 
the law. In fact, this method has an enormous poten­
tial in venturing into one of the most critical areas
1. Conversation with a Deputy Director of the Legislative 
Division of the Chinese Parliament in 1963.
2. A. Podgórecki, «Worker Courts» in Sociology of Law,
ed. V. Aubert, London, 1969.
of the legal sciences: the investigation of the link 
between expressed or internalized legal values and 
legal behavior. Knowledge of the conditions which 
make the ties between legal values and legal behav­
ior strong, or weak, are still almost unknown.
the questionnaire and interview method
The interview method consists of a controlled con­
versation in accordance with a prearranged schedule, 
and is designed to provide data on facts, opinions or 
judgments. Such a procedure allows for face-to-face 
contact between interviewer and respondent; asking 
additional questions in depth about some; asking 
carefully structured and weighted questions; control­
ling the situation in which the declarations are made. 
Moreover, conversation allows one to asses to what 
degree a respondent is involved in the problem about 
which he is asked; in addition, it allows apprehending 
new problems which might have gone unnoticed, 
and permits supplementation of the schedule during 
the research. A questionnaire is a much less versa­
tile method. It is based essentially on «closed» ques­
tions, offering a list of ready, alternative answers. 
Such answers, of course, can be readily compared.
Opinion polling is sometimes viewed as a distinct 
method because of the presumed importance of the 
question investigated, although from a strictly meth­
odological standpoint it is either an interview, a 
questionnaire, or a combination of the two. These 
methods can be applied above all to studying legal 
sentiments (attitudes) and, so-called, the legal aware­
ness of a society. We know that the binding law is not 
always known in detail by all, and it is by no means 
accepted by the entire society. We also know that 
officially enacted law can sometimes be in conflict 
with the legal sentiment of a society or of some of its 
groups. These phenomena were, until recently, in­
vestigated relatively little and there is an urgent need 
to fill this gap in our knowledge.
These methods appear to be very useful in studying 
the problem of acceptance of the law, especially if 
we distinguish at least three levels of acceptance of 
the law and basic moral norms: (1) Lip-service and 
declaration (purely external endorsement of certain 
values often diverted to meet clearly perceived social 
expectations); (2) Internal acceptance (commitment 
to internalized values which sometimes are not 
externally expressed; for example, in cases where 
values could be regarded as deviant or where there 
is a commitment to values which is not strong enough 
to be a vehicle for corresponding behavior); (3) 
Behavior that is consistent with the values.3
The questionnaire and interview method is, for
3. Z. Sufin, Kultura Pracy, Warszawa, 1968, p. 172.
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the normatively oriented lawyer, quite paradoxical. 
For him the law properly enacted is valid and has 
a binding force; if it is not properly issued it has no 
binding force. For him the only relevant question 
is: Is the law in question an obligatory one or is it 
not?
Thus, the presently existing version of jurispru­
dence is hardly able to grasp the real socio-legal, 
let alone normative, problems. For a normatively 
oriented lawyer the official binding law ought to be 
accepted, and being accepted should be obeyed. If 
the law is not accepted and is consequently violated, 
he who violates the law should be punished. This 
is not only too simple to be true, it is also too simple 
to be a functioning model. The depth of acceptance 
of the law, the relationship between legal norms and 
moral values, rationalizations offered for and against 
the law, several invisible factors such as principled 
or instrumental attitudes, individualistic or social 
orientation in ethics, directions of affiliation, make 
the situation more complicated than described by 
existing jurisprudence. The poverty of traditional 
methods used in jurisprudence is partially respon­
sible for this narrow-minded point of view.
Interview and questionnaire methods, when effi­
ciently used, could bring about a broader recognition 
of the many ramifications of a given legal system. 
They could also elucidate the uniqueness of each 
legal system under study. To some extent, they could 
investigate the most crucial problem of socio-legal 
studies: the link between expressed values and actual 
behavior pertaining to legal norms. However, to 
study this particular problem other methods should 
be used as the basic tools of inquiry.
the comparative method
The comparative method could take into consid­
eration some norms, precepts or rules which exist 
in one legal system and compare them to similar ele­
ments in other legal systems. The possible similarities 
of norms in different systems, the more or less essen­
tial discrepancies between them could lead to much 
speculation. But such speculations will remain just 
that unless the social backgrounds of the legal sys­
tems compared and the uniqueness of the systems 
under study are considered. Nevertheless, until 
recently the comparative method dealt only with com­
parisons of selected elements in one legal system with 
selected elements of another legal system. Obviously 
this type of traditional approach is too narrow.
If the comparative method of studying legal norms 
and systems intends to include studies of the social 
settings, then the method should investigate the 
values and attitudes which adhere behind these norms 
and legal systems. In this case, what is the difference 
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between this particular method and the interview and 
questionnaire method? From a methodological point 
of view the difference is not essential. The comparative 
study method is distinguished from other methods 
because of its practical importance. Comparative 
studies of an a priori centralistic kind may be opposed 
to the federalistic ones.
The a priori- centralistic study consists in adopting, 
in advance, some research concept. The stock of 
knowledge acquired so far is a basis for determining 
the various social systems to be covered with compar­
ative studies and for adapting, on the basis of gen­
eral a priori assumptions, the detailed hypotheses 
which should be verified in the social systems thus 
determined. It is worth stressing at the outset that 
this type of study carries with it a notable risk of er­
ror. That is, the studies under way are liable to prove 
that the social systems under investigation are not 
at all comparable on the ground of the generally a- 
dopted hypotheses; various additional factors omit­
ted at the initial stage of the research play an essential 
part, and the already formalized and rigidified re­
search or ossified assumptions do not permit a grasp 
of these factors. Moreover, it may turn out that var­
ious apparently organizational considerations are 
in fact methodological problems difficult to overcome. 
The results of pursuits based on a priori concepts 
are general and do not yield sufficiently interesting 
data for analysis of the respective social systems.
These methodological difficulties may be increased 
by an important additional factor. So far, no clear 
answer has been given to the question of whether the 
comparative studies (irrespective of those employing 
comparative control groups, apart from proper 
investigation) involve comparisons between differ­
ent social systems determined by various national­
ities, states or even political camps. There is also 
the possibility of conducting comparative studies 
of various systems and comparing the results with 
those of subsystem researches. Thus, the research 
on the functioning of different legal systems could 
be compared with the operation of various philo- 
and anti-legal subcultures acting within the framework 
of the given social system.
However, this means no end of the methodological 
difficulties involved in comparative studies. For in 
dealing with various social systems, they may pick 
as their dependent variables (i. e., those features 
influenced by other factors) homogeneous or het­
erogeneous dependent variables. The legal system 
is a homogeneous variable, for as a rule a given social 
system creates its appropriate formal system, i.e., 
the legal one. And, at the same time, the respective 
social systems (as nations) generate the specific 
national character, unique in its particular synthesis 
of features shaped by different historical factors.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/12/2020 20:52:00 |
empirical sociology of law
1 Comparative studies of such factors as the family, 
abor, local authority, and so-called leisure time are 
not in an equally privileged situation—from a 
methodological point of view-—as is the relevant 
research on law. Thus, for example, family patterns 
are shaped in different ways under various social 
systems. This is, however, due not only to the dif­
ference in the systems under which a family functions, 
but also to a number of additional factors such as 
the economic, social, demographic and other condi­
tions also modifying it.
In this connection comparative theoretical and di­
agnostic research should also be mentioned. The first 
type aims to establish the dissimilarity of various 
features, for example, of families, modes of spending 
leisure time, the operation of local authority within 
various societies, etc. Nothing more is determined 
however; it is simply ascertained that under a given 
social system there exist monogamous families while, 
under a different system, polygamous ones prevail.
The difference between comparative diagnostic 
and theoretical research consists in that the latter 
involves—apart from the formulation of the diag­
nostic statements as noted above—-an attempt to 
verify definite correlations. As has already been in­
dicated, verification of theoretical correlations of 
various degree is possible only when the variables 
under investigation are of a homogeneous nature. 
And since the legal system and its elements are char­
acterized by just the homogeneity indispensable 
to comparative theoretical research, comparative 
studies of legal systems are particularly valuable 
as those able to furnish not only diagnostic data but 
also the possibility of formulating adequate hypothe­
ses concerning general regularities.
The federalistic type of research tends to avoid 
the limitations of an a priori centralized kind of 
research. Thus, federalistic research, availing itself 
of earlier investigations and treating them as pilot 
studies, use a two-step method in its execution.
In their first stage, federalistic research studies 
analyze the application of specific legal concepts 
against the backgrounds of their own social systems. 
At this first stage, attention is focussed on the fol­
lowing issues: analysis of similar operation of dif­
ferent legal concepts under similar social systems; 
analysis of possible cases of similar operation of 
different legal concepts under different social systems. 
The experience acquired at this first stage is conducive 
to the preparation of common synthetic research 
instruments (questionnaires, a specific set of proce­
dures using complementary statistical techniques, 
modes of coding data, etc.) which would permit 
and prepare for the second stage.
At the second stage of the research, various le­
gal systems may be compared in a methodologically
conscious manner that takes into account their spe­
cific character (resulting for example from histori­
cally traditional conditioning), their community 
with others (due, for instance, to affiliation with the 
same camp of socialist countries) or the possible 
community of legal concepts or legal norms—su­
preme in the respective social systems. (It may well 
be that no such community exists apart from that in 
matters of minor social importance such as the of­
fense of incest, though certain unifying tendencies pro­
viding for such community are to be observed, e.g., 
the Bill of the Rights of Man.)
In order not to be too abstract, let us present as an 
illustration of the usefulness of this method, some 
findings which were obtained through its applica­
tion. Some hypotheses will be given below which 
attempt to generalize findings from Polish,1 Danish,2 
Dutch and Belgian,3 Finnish,4 and West German,5 
studies.
1) Legal controllers (all those agents of social 
and legal systems who are supposed, according 
to their positions, to implement the law) are more 
tolerant in questions of infringement of basic 
social rules of coexistence (the basic norms valid 
in small social groups) than the average population.
Thus, judges in Poland and Finland, and fiscal 
inspectors in Holland generally display more toler­
ance in condemning infringements of basic social 
norms than does the general population. They proba­
bly realize better the illusory nature of rigorism 
as a means of social engineering.
2) The average population condemns infringements 
of basic rules of coexistence to a somewhat higher 
degree than do repeated trespassers of the law 
(recidivists).6
1. A. Podgórecki, J. Kurczewski, J. Kwàs niewski. M. Kos, 
Poglady Spoleczen stwa Polskiego na Moralnose i Prawo, 
Ksioika i Wiedza, Warszawa, 1971.
2. B. Kutchinsky, Knowledge and Attitudes Regarding Law 
and Law Breaking, Washington, 1972 (mimeographed paper).
3. J. Van Houtte, P. Vinke, Attitudes Governing the Accep­
tance of Legislation among Various Population Groups (mim­
eographed material), Nordwijk, 1972.
4. K. Mäkelä, «Public Sense of Justice and Judicial Prac­
tice,» Acta Soziologica, No. 10, Copenhagen, 1966.
A. Blom, National Confidence in the Judiciary, Tutki Mus- 
seloste Research Report, University of Tampere, Finland Nr. 
7, 1969.
5. W. Kaupen, Knowledge and Opinion of Law and Legal 
Institutions, Köln, 1970 (mimeographed material).
6. Data from Greece and the United States (W. Reckless 
and A. Mylonas) do not support this generalization (according 
to these studies the difference is quite substantial). Neverthe­
less this study tackled the problem from a different angle: the 
study investigated mainly the attitudes toward sanctions and 
agents of sanctions. This could be the reason for the inconsis­
tency among findings. A.D. Mylonas, W. C. Reckless: «At­
titudes toward Law Enforcement in Greece and the United 
States» in Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 
Janug, 1968.
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Danish and Polish data support this hypothesis. This 
condemnation reflects values that are declared and 
even accepted legal values. But they are not necessar­
ily the values that are vehicles of behavior.
3) Legal controllers always condemn infringements 
of norms pertaining to administrative and proce­
dural matters more strongly than does the aver­
age population. Trespassers of the law are always 
more tolerant in these matters.
Polish and Dutch data support this thesis. Stronger 
condemnation of violations of procedure is probably 
connected with the professional «bias» of legal con­
trollers (the previous contradiction between the Da­
nish and Polish studies and the Greek and American 
ones may be due to the absence of a clearer distinc­
tion between basic rules of coexistence and rules 
of procedure).
4) Legal condemnation induces moral condemna­
tion.
Polish data (supported by Dutch, but not West Ger­
man findings) support this thesis. The legal condem­
nation of behavior in violation of rules of procedure 
evokes a tendency to embrace these types of behav­
iors; this also applies to moral condemnation. It 
seems to be a «secondary condemnation» that is, 
it is not connected directly with the behavior that is 
dealt with, but with the fact that the legal order and 
its structure was disrupted.
5) The higher the educational level of respondents, 
the stronger the tendency toward tolerance and in 
favor of re-education as a recognized basic func­
tion of penalties.
Relatively higher education (and also relatively higher 
social position) seems to be connected with a more 
lenient attitude toward all infringements of basic 
rules of social coexistence. Scandinavian and Polish 
data confirm this general finding. Moreover, the bet­
ter educated have a clear tendency to give, as a ra­
tionalization for penal sanctions, re-education rather 
than isolation, deterrence, or—especially—revenge.
The above-mentioned findings should be regarded, 
at the present stage of empirical sociology of law 
(empirical jurisprudence) as tentative and prelimi­
nary. They should be further tested. Nevertheless 
they offer an empirical starting point—they are not 
taken from the air, chair or both.
basic problems of the sociology of law
With such a battery of methods now available, 
for the study of the sociology of law, what sort of 
problems should be regarded as the targets for po­
tential investigations? There are at least three areas 
of reflection and investigation which should be treat­
ed as the main fields of socio-legal studies:
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1) Questions accumulated through a theoretical 
heritage;
2) problems relating to the effectiveness of the law;
3) problems relating to legislative tasks.
The second and third problems belong to the broader 
area of theoretical reasoning described as social 
engineering through law or legal policy. Problems 
connected with the theoretical heritage are the most 
complicated. They create an accumulated stock of 
electrical composition—enormously important ques­
tions, serious problems, ideas which should be trans­
lated into an operational and empirical language; 
concepts which should be rejected as too abstract 
for investigation; notions which are value expressions; 
and, finally, statements which enjoy the legitimacy 
of a lengthy past, but are a semantic potpourri. 
A list of these problems would include: legal norms, 
moral norms, legitimacy, natural law, official law, 
the State, justice, rightness, legal sanctions, elements 
of social control, conformity, deviance, prestige of the 
law, ethical systems, legal systems, legal logic.
All these problems ought to be, after careful se­
mantic analysis, translated into operational and em­
pirical language evaluated from the point of view of the 
existing knowledge and prepared, if necessary, for 
empirical interdisciplinary testing.
This progression from the abstract to the empirical 
stage of reasoning in jurisprudence and sociology 
of law leads to additional meta-problems. If so-called 
official (or positive) law is too narrow a subject for the 
formulation of adequate theories (because this con­
cept omits the instinctive, living law), and if crimi­
nology does not appear to be a reliable enough basis 
for adequate theories (because the scope of criminol­
ogy is determined by the continuously changing 
content of the criminal law), then maybe the theoreti­
cal understanding of jurisprudence, sociology of 
law and criminology should be reformulated. Then the 
sociology of conformity and deviance would appear 
to be the proper subject matter for adequate theories, 
from the theoretical viewpoint, while the sociology 
of law or criminology might limit themselves to the 
changeable scope of the content of the law. Jurispru­
dence could then play the role of a repository of 
heterogeneous problems accumulated because of 
many reasons, some of them quite important, which 
await theoretical clearance.
The questions pertaining to the effectiveness of the 
law are also not easy to solve. First of all, there is a 
strong need for a clear recognition of the limits of 
the use of the law as an instrument of possible social 
change. The two theories of the omnipotence and the 
impotence of the law are false. Undoubtedly law is 
efficient, but only under certain conditions; what are 
these conditions? There are, contrarty to the usual 
expectations, many kinds of effect of the law: expected,
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unexpected, positive, negative, partially positive or 
negative, and the combinations of these, sometimes 
called byproducts. In order to detect these effects (and 
also to evaluate them), it is necessary to have at 
one’s disposal the methods available for their re­
cognition. These methods should be able to determine 
not only the real distribution of effects resulting from 
legal intervention, but should also provide lawyers 
with techniques to foresee its possible effects before 
a law is enacted. The question of deterrence emerges 
here as one of the most important with the tentative 
hypothesis that the punishing sanction is effective 
when it is used by accepted authority or when it is 
used with accord to more general approved values. 
Effective and ineffective law has many motivational 
effects and educational consequences which, after 
they have been internalized, have additional motiva­
tional functions.
All problems connected with the effectiveness of 
the law have several important theoretical aspects 
as well as practical ones. They are directly connected 
with legislative questions. The prevailing method oper­
ating in different countries is to rely on the common 
sense and professional knowledge of lawers in helping 
to prepare legislation. Quite often, surprisingly en­
ough, this procedure is rather sound. But is this 
always the case?
Generally speaking, it is better to relay on system­
atic knowledge than on common sense or professional 
«wisdom.» Paradoxically, in the language of law school 
curricula «legislation» is understood as «drafting.» 
But drafting deals with the semantic make-up of law 
while the whole area of the social setting of the law 
is left to the lawyer’s intuition. The proper methodolo­
gy—and it is necessary to stress this fact—of leg­
islation is very complicated and consists of at 
least seven procedural steps: (1) comparative studies 
of legislation taken from different states, with special 
regard to the possible spectrum of expected and unex­
pected results; (2) recognition of limitations of leg­
islation and awareness of the applicability of a 
proposed law to a given area of social life; (3) adequate 
diagnosis of the situation which is supposed to be 
covered by the legislation. The techniques of the ad­
versary system, as currently practiced, are of some 
use, but the relevant factor behind these techniques 
is the question of the extent to which the social sci­
ences are engaged in the process of preparation of the 
required diagnosis; (4) studies of values are necessa­
ry—not only the values of average citizens and 
the elite, but also of the strata of the population hav­
ing innovative and conservative ideas; (5) access 
to the bank of regularities (hypotheses) governing 
the area of social life which is supposed to be regula­
ted by law (this procedural step is perhaps the most 
important one: if it does exist, a stock of known and
tested regularities is of great importance to the social 
sciences; if it does not exist, then common sense and 
professional knowledge enter the picture); (6) the 
ability to unify all previously mentioned elements in a 
synthesis which creates a legislative plan and strat­
egy; and finally (7) legislative technique (drafting) 
which is the articulation of the plan into legalistic 
language.
It is quite apparent that all these methodological and 
procedural steps are closely connected with the main 
interests of the sociology of law. But, in reality, is 
socio-legal knowledge utilized in order to meet these 
practical (for example, legislative) needs and de­
mands? Only to a very limited extent. There are many 
reasons for this limited use: one is the reluctance of 
legislators to consult experts from the social sciences. 
Another is the prevalent academic, not practical, 
orientation of the social sciences, including the sociol­
ogy of law. These two orientations partially overlap, 
but at the same time partially bypass each other.
If the sociology of law has such potentialities as 
were described in connection with the possible ap­
plicability of different types of methods, and if the 
sociology of law also has some basic theoretical and 
practical problems to solve, what areas of study, then, 
have special importance for this discipline? There 
are several.
areas of research
The studies, reflections, discussions which are 
going on within the confines set by the interests of 
the sociology of law point to the following main areas 
of research: (a) value systems, (b) processes of social­
ization of the legal norms, (c) social determinants 
of the law, (d) social modifiers of the law, (e) the dy­
namics of legal institutions.
The break with the traditional concept that the only 
law is a binding, official law has opened a vast area 
for investigation—that of legal values and attitudes. 
Although values have long been an important subject 
of legal studies, inquires of this kind in the past were 
directed toward ideal law—the goal of the law. Indeed, 
studies on the axiomatic aspects of law are of great 
importance, but for a long time these studies over­
shadowed the other possibility—the empirical study 
of the real attitudes which the different strata of a 
given social system have toward the law. At the 
present time this latter type of study is very popular.
When the law lost its sacred character it became 
apparent that law itself also served as an object of 
socialization. The law is thus not only a socializing, 
entity, it is also the set, the structure of values, 
which could be—within this or that other scope, 
to this or that degree—socialized. With this, many 
problems emerged pertaining to : (1) the agents of
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socialization (it was discovered that not only the State 
and Church, but also the family, school and peers are 
possible agents of socialization as they sypport, con­
tradict, and compete with each other); (2) techniques 
of socialization (it was found that rewards, punish­
ments, patterns of behavior could be regarded as a 
means for channeling expected behavior into desired 
roles); (3) degrees of socialization (it became apparent 
that not all declared values are accepted, that not 
all accepted values are declared, and, finally, that 
declared and accepted values are not the only moti­
ves for actual behavior); (4) targets of socialization 
(it became clear that there are different types of tar­
gets for socialization: youth, deviants, subgroups 
such as immigrants, etc.).
Traditionally, the role of economic, political, and 
demographic factors as determinants of the law has 
been well recognized. Thus it is not necessary to 
stress and develop this particular point of view. Never­
theless, it might be proper to say that sometimes 
these (and other elements) have been taken into ac­
count as multiple factors and sometimes certain ones 
among them were particularly stressed. Economic 
factors, for instance, have been emphasized as playing 
dominant role in shaping the structure of the legal 
system.
The influence exerted by subcultures in modeling 
the law was discovered only recently. There is still a 
lack of clarity regarding the possible types of subcul­
tures which should be taken into account. However, 
at least three should be distinguished: negative (for 
instance recidivists), positive (for instance law officers) 
and neutral.
The nature of the interaction taking place inside 
institutions and organizations has been considered 
by those concerned with the sociology of organiza­
tion. Let us avoid the fruitless discussion of the bor­
derlines between the disciplines in the social sciences. 
In this particular instance, it would be better to in­
corporate some of the findings which traditionally 
belong to the sociology of organization into the so­
ciology of law. The way in which the law is perceived, 
transformed, strengthened, weakened, made into a 
symbol, instrument, pragmatic, device or defense 
mechanism by the organization has tremendous im­
portance for the functioning of the law. Institutions 
and organizations generate, accumulate and emulate 
several social processes, and this takes place not 
only within a given institution but also between several 
legal or non-legal institutions, and molds the law in 
many different ways. All of them add some meaning 
to, or subtract meaning from, the abstract legal 
norms.
It would be a mistake to treat the above-cited areas 
of research as final and complete. These areas are in­
terrelated with research methods and, above all, with
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the basic problems in which the sociology of law is 
involved. Nonetheless, it might be useful to list them 
so as to cover the whole array of problems belong­
ing to the sociology of law (or which should, for meth­
odological reasons, belong there).
conclusions
The sociology of law has been able to accumulate 
several cognitive experiences which have validity not 
only for the bulk of legal sciences but also for sociol­
ogy itself. For theoretical sociology the sociology 
of law creates a virgin area. The time is ripe to en­
rich vegetating sociological theory with new stimuli 
from the outside. The legal sciences and legal policy 
(social engineering through the law) need a set of 
middle-range theories.
One attempt of this sort was made through the for­
mulation of the hypothesis of the three-factor fun­
ctioning of the law. The hypothesis of the three-factor 
functioning of the law holds that an abstract binding 
law influences social behavior by means of three ba­
sic variables. The first independent variable is the 
content and significance rendered the given legal enact­
ment by the type of socioeconomic relations within 
which it constitutes a binding element of the legal 
system. The second independent variable is the kind 
of subculture functioning in the framework of a given 
socioeconomic system as a link between the legislator’s 
directives and the social behavior of those bound by 
the law. The third independent variable which may 
variously modify the functioning of an abstract law 
(within the framework of a given socioeconomic sys­
tem and legal subculture) is the type of personality 
of the subjects affected by the law. Abstract laws 
begin to function and to be expressed in social be­
havior through the media of their human subjects. 
Into this mediation enter the law itself and three 
meta-standards: those springing from the nature of 
the socioeconomic system, those deriving their con­
tent from given legal subcultures, and those flowing 
from the individual personality of decision-makers 
and addresses of legal norms.
A second attempt could be made by a deliberate 
division which should be directed toward the very 
heart of the law—its concept. It seems reasonable 
to distinguish two incompatible definitions of the law: 
the practical and theoretical. The practical one (fix­
ed for clearly practical reasons, to give a judge or a 
lawyer a guiding line between law and non-law) would 
hold that the law is a norm generated by the proper 
authority and supplied with a compulsory sanction. 
The theoretical one would say that the law is the so­
cial norm which is based on four reciprocal ele­
ments—belonging to the parallel parties and con­
taining the corresponding pairs of rights and du-
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ties.1 Usually the norm is functional for the given 
system. It means that the norm is designed not 
only in such a way that it would be consistent with 
the legal system and its requirements, but is used 
also as an instrument which is supposed to contrib­
ute to the integrity of this social system. Formal­
ized norms prescribed for different occasions a- 
mong different social strata with respect to the distri­
bution of duties and claims work in a balanced way— 
as tested and verified by existing, visible and accept­
ed social experience—toward unifying and integ­
rating the given social system, and against the pos­
sible anomie—oriented disintegration of this sys­
tem. This is the theoretical definition. But in order 
to use the existing law, to apply it, the practical defi­
nition must be employed. In order to understand, 
and effectively to introduce a new law to modify an 
existing one or to annul it, the theoretical definition 
should be employed. Let us now suspend a more 
detailed discussion on this subject, with one salient 
remark: the practical definition gives a relatively 
good orientation as to what belongs within the scope 
of the binding law, but is not able to cover all types 
of the functioning law. On the other hand the theo­
retical definition gives a clear recognition of the law 
in action, but does not provide direct indication of 
which norms should be applied. This dual structure 
of the definition of the law reflects the dual character 
of the sciences involved: the practical one, which 
is oriented toward efficient application, and the theo­
retical,oriented toward understanding and explanation.
A third attempt could be made by introducing some 
new notions into jurisprudence and the sociology of 
law. Many of the existing notions are obsolete or 
inadequate: legal concepts tend to be abstract; so­
ciological concepts are alien to legal problems; psycho­
logical notions do not grasp the social reality of
1. For more elaborated notion of this definition : A. Podgó-
lecki, Toward a General Theory in the Sociology of Law, 1973 
(mimeographed material).
the law; and finally, the relevant concepts in the 
area of social psychology have not yet been gener­
ated. Therefore it would be advisable to work in the 
direction of elaborating such concepts as: principled 
and instrumental attitudes (attitudes which sponta­
neously support the law or are inclined to use it as 
an instrument); individualistic and social orienta­
tions in ethics (orientation toward conformity to 
norms characterizing behavior in small groups, 
or the orientation which takes into account the con­
sequences of a person’s social role or position); 
types and degrees of affiliation to an institution, 
group or social system.
A measurable answer to the question, «What is the 
sociology of law?» may, in the light of these consider­
ations, be formulated as follows. The sociology of 
law consists not only of the bare application of socio­
logical methods to the old problems of the philoso­
phy of law. The sociology of law in its mature version 
would be an empirical replacement of jurisprudence. 
Attempts to deal with the traditional problems of 
jurisprudence from the viewpoint of the sociology 
of law would open a rich new area to research. The 
sociology of law brings something unique to general 
sociology: new notions which have potential explana­
tory power and a new sense of the integrity of the 
social system. And, finally, the sociology of law is 
now a field which is broader than it was traditionally 
perceived: The studies on the functioning of the law 
take into consideration not only sociological methods, 
but also such methods as the historical, statistical, 
comparative, experimental, anthropological, etc. The 
approach which is now needed is more comprehen­
sive, more holistic. It is not ruled out that the sociolo­
gy of law should now have—from the methodologi­
cally pure point of view—the name of anthropology 
of law.2
2. The possible shift of emphasis from sociology of law to 
anthropology of law should be regarded not as a search for a 
formula which would solve the problems of the understanding 
of the law and its functioning but as a symptom of steadily 
but consequently growing unification of social sciences.
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